Investigations of the effect of quality differences on heterogeneous performance in exporting have been limited by lack of direct measures of quality. We examine exports of French wine, matching the exporting firms to producer ratings from two wine guidebooks. We show that high quality producers export to more markets, charge higher prices, and sell more in each market. Our model predicts quality sorting: the more difficult a market is to serve, the better on average will be the firms that serve it. Our findings point to the empirical importance of quality sorting in one industry and could be extended to other industries. * PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE. We thank Isaac Holloway for research assistance and Andy Bernard for very helpful suggestions.
Introduction
Why do some firms export more intensively and extensively than others? In the seminal papers of Melitz (2003) and Bernard, Eaton, Jenson, and Kortum (2003) the answer is productivity differences. However, measures of physical output per unit of input are rarely available at the firm level, forcing reliance on proxies like domestic market shares or value-added per worker. These variables can be driven by primitives other than physical productivity, such as product quality. A separate literature on quality and trade relies on noisy proxies (unit values). We study French wine exports, where we are able to match firm-destination-level export flows to firm-level quality ratings from wine guides.
Prior work on quality and trade has examined both the supply side and demand side. Supply side research asks what makes a country export higher quality goods (as inferred from unit values)? Schott (2004) finds that within goods categories, unit values tend to increase with the exporters' per capita income, capital to labor ratio, skill ratio, and the capital intensity of production. Hummels and Klenow (2005) find that, within categories, price and quantity indexes rise with origin-country income per capita. The elasticities are 0.09 (price) and 0.34 (quantity). The authors interpret their price result as showing why big countries do not suffer from a negative terms of trade effect (as they would in a model without quality differentiation). Rather than drive down the value of their single variety, large countries export more varieties and also higher quantities and prices of each variety. Hummels and Klenow also argue in favour of a model with Romer (1994) fixed costs per export market.
Demand-side papers ask what makes country demand a larger share of high quality goods (again inferred from unit values)? Hummels and Skiba (2004) find that average FOB export price rise with freight costs to destination market. They interpret this as a confirmation of the Alchian-Allen (1969) effect ("shipping the good apples out").
1 Hallak (2006) estimates destination-country income effects and find evidence supporting the hypothesis that richer countries have relatively high demand for high quality. Hallak estimates an interaction between unit values (based on the US import data) and income per capita.
2
This paper contributes to the quality and trade literature in terms of data and method. "Direct" quality measures compared to "inferred" quality (unit values, market shares). Firm-level quality measures matched to firm-level destination-specific exports. Our model combines the Hallak assumption on preferences for quality with the Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) assumption on the cost of quality. Methodologically, we develop new predictions for the heterogeneous quality model, relating conditional means to market attractiveness measures.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first derive new testable predictions from a model of firm-level heterogeneity in quality. Then we explain why applying this model to champagne and burgundy producers makes sense. Next we estimate the firm-level equations of that model and back out the implied values of the key structural parameters. Utilizing fixed effects estimated in the firm-level regressions, we estimate the conditional mean relationships implied by the model. Our conclusion suggests a research program based on the success of the quality sorting model as well as the empirical anomalies we find.
Theory
The theory examined in this paper is based on work by Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) , who introduced a cost-quality tradeoff in the model of Melitz (2003) , who introduced productivity-heterogeneity in the model of Krugman (1980) , who introduced trade costs to the monopolistic competition model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) . We also draw on Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2005) .
General Set-up
We consider a category of goods (in our case, an 8-digit goods classification) with a subutility function that is assumed to have a constant elasticity of substitution (CES), σ > 1, over the set, B j , of all varieties, i available in country j:
In this expression q(i) denotes quantity of variety i consumed and s(i) denotes its measured quality.
3 Following Hallak (2006) , the intensity of the consumers' desire for quality is captured in parameter γ. The sub-utility enters full utility with a Cobb-Douglas expenditure parameter denoted µ j . The foreign country comprises M j individuals with y j income per capita.
We assume that, within a detailed product classification, each firm exports a single variety.
4 . The solution to the consumers' utility maximization is usually expressed in terms of trade-cost inclusive export values. For data reasons, we want to work with FOB values. Hence, we divided the market j consumers' desired expenditures on firm i by a trade cost factor, τ j (i), to obtain FOB exports. Using x j (i) to denote FOB exports, we obtain
In the above expression prices paid by consumers in j are given by p j (i)τ j (i), where τ j (i) − 1 is the ad valorem tariff equivalent of all trade costs incurred by firm i to sell in market j.
Using w(i) to denote the factor price index and z(i) to denote factor productivity, a firm's unit costs of production are given by w(i)/z(i). We make the non-standard assumption of firm-varying factor prices to take into account the idea that a firm making high-quality output might be required to use more expensive inputs. The model entails a constant mark-up, σ/(σ − 1), which can be factored out of the numerator and the denominator of equation (2). Taken together, these assumptions imply export revenue from market j is given by
where the price index is defined in terms of quality-adjusted costs,
.
It is useful to collect all country-specific determinants of exports into a single factor. To do, we specify τ j (i) −σ in terms of a country-level factor and an idiosyncratic firmdestination factor. Thus, we assume
There are a variety of possible interpretations for η j (i). It might represent the firm's network of connections with purchasers in each destination country. Alternatively, it could represent country-specific differences in tastes that impact firm-level demand. The important thing is that it allows the model to accommodate the fact that the two firms with the same observed quality, s, may export differing amounts to the same country. It also allows for violations in the hierarchy of markets served. Without a stochastic component in trade costs, all French firms that serve Thailand for instance, a remote and relatively small market, should also export to all "easier" countries. Eaton et al. (2005) show that this hierarchy does not hold in its strict version, a finding we can confirm for wine exporters. Firm-specific variation in trade costs are one way to account for this finding. As shown in subsection 2.7, heterogeneous η j (i) introduce a structural error term for firm-level regressions. The net contribution to firm profits of market j is given by
where A j is a factor that aggregates the determinants of the attractiveness of country j defined as
Attractiveness depends positively on the size (µ j y j M j ) and relative accessability (φ j P σ−1 j ) of the market.
The cost-quality tradeoff
We have so far allowed for heterogeneity in productivity (the standard approach following Melitz (2003) ), factor prices, quality, and trade costs. Four sources of heterogeneity is too many for a tractable model. One option is to hold w/z constant and have a model of pure (costless) quality variation. The problem with this is that in the Dixit-Stiglitz framework, mark-ups do not vary across firms and so quality has no independent effect on price. In this framework the only way to make prices depend on quality is to have a relationship between costs and quality. We follow Baldwin and Harrigan (2007) in assuming that this relationship takes the form of a deterministic parametric tradeoff. In particular, we assume that when firms draw high quality, a cost must be paid in terms of higher unit costs (either because of higher factor prices or lower productivity or both):
with λ ≥ 0.We discuss the reasons to expect such a relationship for wine in section 3. Using equation (6), we can express the key behavioural equations of the model in terms of the remaining sources of heterogeneity. Export values are given by
Individual firms charge FOB prices of
Thus, the model predicts that firms charge the same FOB prices to all destinations and that these prices increase in quality with elasticity λ. A more general model might incorporate pricing-to-market via cross-country differences in σ, and hence the mark-up. Export quantities can be obtained by dividing (7) by the equation for FOB prices, (8):
The parameterization of our model in terms of γ and λ is useful because when set γ = 0 and λ = −1, utility does not depend directly on s and costs are inversely related to s, i.e. w(i)/z(i) = ω/s(i). Hence, we can reinterpret s(i) as a productivity draw. This allows us to compare the results of the quality-sorting model (γ > λ ≥ 0) with the original Melitzian productivity sorting model (γ = 0, λ = −1). As can be seen in equation (9), both models predict that higher s leads to higher export quantities. However, the price effects differ in sign. When s is interpreted as costly-quality it causes higher prices but when s is a productivity draw, it causes low prices. This distinction is important later because it leads to contrasting predictions for conditional mean prices and quantities.
Entry threshold quality
The next step is to determine which firms export to a given destination. Substituting (6) into (5), we obtain
For any given value of η we can solve for the critical level of quality below which entry into market j becomes unprofitable:
Equation (11) shows the level of quality needed to enter market j is a decreasing function of how "easy" this market is for the average French exporter, which is captured by A j and the firm's idiosyncratic access to the market, captured in η. On the flip-side, higher fixed (F ) or variable (ω) costs increase the quality cut-off, which means that lower quality firms will not be able to sell abroad. We assume that s(i) and η j (i) are independently distributed with probability density functions (PDFs) denoted g(s) and h(η), respectively. The probability of entering is given by
The precise functional of h(η) can be left unspecified for the moment. However, to obtain closed form solutions, we have to adopt a tractable distribution for s. We follow much of the recent literature in assuming a Pareto distribution for firm-level heterogeneity s. Thus, assume that the CDF, G(s), and PDF, g(s), take the forms
Plugging in equation (11) forŝ j (η) and assuming s is Pareto, we can express the probability of exporting to a market as a function of its attractiveness:
whereŝ (1) is the quality cut-off from a firm with η = 1 and η 1 is defined as
The total pool of firms that might export to market j is given by N x , which we treat as an exogenous variable. The share of firms exporting to a market j is N j /N x ≈ Pr[π j (i) > 0]. The approximation operator, ≈, is used because N j /N x only converges on the probability in the limit. We refer to N j as the "popularity" of market j. Equation (14) shows that popularity is predicted to be a power function of the attractiveness of the market, A j .
We now proceed to specify predictions for measurable aggregate statistics: the average quality, average price, and average quantity for each destination market j. We show the relationship between the conditional expected values of these variables and both attractiveness, A j , and popularity, N j .
Conditional expected quality
The average quality of exporters to a given market is E[s | π j (i) > 0]. The general form for the expected value is
To obtain the numerator, we start by integrating over s, conditional on η:
Substituting the expression forŝ j (η) shown in (11) and integrating over all values of η, the numerator of (15) is
where η 2 is defined as
Dividing (17) by the probability of entry obtained from equation (14), the expected value of quality exported to a given market is
We can estimate the expected value of quality using the observed average quality level of exporters to a given market:
where H j is set of French exporters to j
The testable predictions are straightforward. Anything that makes a market more attractive (higher A j ) will reduces j , the average level of quality (in the quality sorting model) or the average level of productivity (in the productivity sorting model). In a reduced form equation A j can be approximated as a positive function of market size and a negative function of distance (or any other measurable proxy for trade costs to j). Average performance (quality or efficiency) of French exporters in j should therefore decrease with population and average income in j and increase with distance to j. Note that if fixed costs were also increasing in distance, the overall prediction is unchanged: more distant markets should exhibit higher average performance (quality or productivity).
The preceding approach to testing the theory relies upon specifying A j as a parametric function of observables. This may be problematic because A j collects a potentially large set of variables, some of which (e.g. the trade costs that determine φ j ) are difficult to measure. We also use a method described below to estimate A j directly as a destination fixed effect in a firm-level quantity regression. A third approach is to express conditional expected quality in terms of the observable number of firms that actually enters a market, N j .
This achieved by first inverting equation (14) to obtain A j as a function of Pr[π j (i) > 0]. Then one substitutes this value into equation (18) and simplifies to obtain
If the sample is large enough, N j /N x should approximate Pr[π j (i) > 0]. The observed conditional mean quality of exporters to a market,s j should be approximately a power function of the observed number of entrants:
It is very easy to investigate the performance of this prediction graphically without the need for any data on the destination countries. One simply graphs average quality of the exporters to a destination against the number of exporters, with both variables shown in a log scale. There should be a negative linear relationship between the two variables with a slope given by −1/κ. The same prediction applies to average productivity if one were working with the original Melitz model. Thus one cannot use the relationship between the average performance indicator and market popularity to discriminate between the models. However, performance has differing implications for price and quantity in the quality and productivity sorting models. Hence, one can use the signs of the relationships between average price and quantity to attractiveness and popularity to discriminate between the alternative types of sorting.
Conditional expected price
The expected price conditional on exporting closely is given by
To obtain the numerator we start by plugging in equation (8) for p(s) and integrating over s, conditional on η:
For the integral to be finite we need κ > λ. Substituting the expression forŝ j (η) shown in (11) and integrating over all values of η, the numerator of (22) is
where η 3 is defined as
Dividing (24) by the probability of entry obtained from equation (14), the expected value of price exported to a given market is
We can estimate the expected value of price using the observed average price level of exporters to a given market:
Recall that attractiveness,
. In the quality sorting model, where γ > λ > 0, the average price should therefore be a negative function of population (M j ), income per capita (y j ) and taste for wine (µ j ). It should however be increasing in distance d j , which enters τ j positively. A reduced form equation of the quality sorting model can be estimated in the following form:
where α 1 , α 2 < 0 and α 3 > 0. This is a reduced form equation since i) not all components of trade costs are controlled for, ii) the fixed cost is left constant 6 , iii) the unobservable preference parameter µ j and price index P j are left in the disturbance term. The efficiency sorting model calls for opposite coefficients on all those variables, enabling for a discriminating test between those two views of exporters' sorting.
We can also express the conditional mean of price in terms of popularity.
As with mean quality, the mean price conditional on exporting is decreasing in N j /N x for the quality sorting model. However, the prediction is opposite for the efficiency sorting model, which you obtain by setting γ = 0 and λ = −1. When quality sorting takes place, only high quality varieties get exported to difficult countries, and those are high price varieties, because high quality is associated with high costs in our setting. When efficiency sorting is the driver of firms' selection into export markets, only the most productive firms with low marginal cost make it to difficult markets, and-with a constant markup-those have a low price.
Conditional expected quantity exported
The expected quantity, conditional on exporting profitably to market, is given by
Substituting in equation (9) for q, we start by evaluating
For the integral to be finite, we assume κ > γ(σ − 1) − λσ. This expression is more complex than the corresponding equation, (23) obtained for prices. In particular, both A j andŝ j enter average exports, while onlyŝ j (η) enters average price. The reason has to do with the intensive and extensive margins of trade increases in this model. In a Dixit-Stiglitz setup, prices are a constant markup over marginal costs, and in particular do not depend on market size or anything that enters A j . Therefore, a rise in market attractiveness A j impact prices only through the extensive margin, the entry of firms into export market j, theŝ j (η) term in (23). Quantities sold by each firm that exports to j do however depend on A j . Consequently, (30) depends on the extensive marginŝ j (η), but also on the intensive one through the independent impact of A j . Next, we substitute (11) into (30) and integrate over η to obtain
where η 4 is defined as
The final step is to divide (31) by (14), the probability of being a profitable exporter to j , yielding
We can estimate the expected value of quantity as the average of the observed average quantity of exporters to a given market:
The power on A j is positive as long as quality is "worthwhile," i.e. γ > λ. Under the parameterization corresponding to productivity sorting (γ = 0, λ = −1), the power on
, a reduced form equation of the quality sorting model can be estimated in the following equation:
When F does not vary across countries, the prediction is very simple and opposite to the one on prices: β 1 , β 2 > 0 and β 3 < 0. This is a reduced form equation for the same reasons as the price equation. Again, the Melitzian productivity sorting model calls for opposite coefficients on all those variables, enabling a discriminating test between those two types of exporter sorting. In the quality sorting model, easy markets see lower quality firms on average export high quantities of low price goods. In the productivity sorting case, those same high A j countries face exports by less efficient firms on average that charge high prices and sell less. There appears to some ambiguity regarding the F term. Suppose that F j is a positive function of d j . In the average price equation, the sign prediction on α 3 is unchanged since τ j and F j are raised to the same power in (25). This is not the case in the mean quantity equation (32) since (σ − 1)γ − σλ > 0 as long as γ > λ > 0 and σ > 1. In that case, d j has a positive influence on average quantity through F j and a negative one through τ j in A j . In the productivity sorting parameterization, expected quantity is increasing in both τ and F . Therefore distance should unambiguously raise average quantity.
Note the powers on A j and ω in equation 32 are equal in absolute values, but of opposite sign to the corresponding powers int expected price equation (25) . Using the same steps to derive the expected export value, E[x | π j (i) > 0], leads to the striking result that it is independent of A j . Thus, the average firm exports the same value (pq) to large and small markets. This feature of the model, which appears to be driven by functional forms was also obtained independently by Eaton et al. (2005) and Lawless and Whelan (2007) for the productivity sorting model. The last step is to substitute for A j as a function of the probability of entry and then plug the result into equation (32) as we did with prices. Again recognizing that we can approximate the unobservable entry probability with the observed popularity of the market, we obtain an expression for the conditional expectation of quantity with respect to popularity:q
Average quantity exported to j is a positive function of popularity, N j /N x , in the case of the quality sorting model, and again the sign of the relationship is reversed when in the productivity sorting model. Table 1 summarizes the predicted elasticities derived from equations (14), (18), (21), (25), (28), (18) and (21). We contrast the predictions for quality sorting with the Melitzian productivity sorting parameterization. The key takeaways are that measured attractiveness, A j , and popularity, N j , have the same signs for all their predicted effects on average quality, price, and quantity. The table highlights the opposing signs for price and quantity and the way the signs flip when one goes from the quality sorting case to the productivity sorting case. These predictions allow for testing the general validity of the approach and also give the potential to discriminate between quality and productivity sorting. 
Firm-level predictions
We can estimate the model using firm-level data for three different dependent variables: the probability of exporting, the FOB price, and exported quantity. Taking logs of equations (10), (8), and (9) we can obtain estimating equations.
The probability of exporting is given by
Using equation (7) to express x j (i) in terms of its determinants, firm i will export to j with probability:
The parameters of this probability can be estimated using a binary choice model whose form depends on the assumption made on the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term η j (i). Assuming log-normality for η j (i) implies a probit form. This is the assumption made in Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2007) . Assuming log-normal η also implies that OLS will be the maximum likelihood estimator for the firm-level quantity equation.
On the other hand, if we let η be distributed log-logistic (also called the Fisk distribution), then we can use the fixed effects logit which has the advantage of absorbing the countryyear fixed effects for the A j .
The Stata command is "xtlogit, fe"
From (8), the price charged by firm i takes the following estimable form:
The price equation in this model lacks an error term. However, for parallelism with the quantity equation, we will a normally distributed (in log scale) error with countryyear specific fixed effects. One possible interpretation of the fixed effects are that σ varies across markets and the fixed effects estimate ln[σ j /(σ j −1)]. However, this is unattractive because it implies country-specific elasticities with respect to quality in the quantity and export equations. From (9), the firm-level exported quantity is
. (38) For export probabilities and quantities, ln A j appears on the RHS. Rather than attempt to estimate this term as a parametric function of country j primitives, we absorb it with country-year-specific fixed effects.
We have also estimated a semi-parametric form of these regressions in which we replace ln s(i) with a set of indicator variables corresponding to the number of stars accorded to the producer. Our initial assessment was that the gain from more flexibility was not high enough to offset the cost in terms of the inability to extract estimates of γ and λ and the greater number of coefficients to report and discuss.
Why Wine?
Champagne (nc8 22041011) and red burgundy (nc8 22042143) have built reputations for non-replicable attributes. Thus, they exhibit Armington-style differentiation by place of origin. With Champagne this is an organized legal and promotional effort. To qualify as champagne in the EU (and Canada), a wine must be produced within the Champagne geographic appelation.
"The important thing to remember is that while some processes of Champagne production may be duplicated, the terroir is unique, original, and impossible to replicate." (www.champagne.us) Some wine critics agree with the proposition that sparking wine from Champagne is distinct:
"The Champagne region has certain natural advantages that no amount of money, ambition, or talent can surmount: The combination of chalky soil and fickle northern European weather yields sparkling wines that simply can't be replicated anyplace else, or at least anyplace that's been tried." (Steinberger, 2005) Burgundy producers do not invest in such overt promotion of their regional identity. However, wine critics tend to judge pinot noir wines relative to the Burgundian style. Furthermore, the most expensive wines in the world are red burgundies.
The relevance for this study is that Melitz (2003) model, upon which we base our analysis, assumes that firms face only the option of exporting or not to a given market. They cannot relocate production as in the Helpman, Melitz, Yeaple (2004) framework. With footloose production, the implications for quality sorting could be quite different. Thus, the geographic definition of champagne and burgundy makes these goods particularly appropriate for studying the effect of heterogeneity on the composition of exporters by destination.
While the model rests upon a product that is not reproducible in the export market, it also insists on firm-level differentiation within each country. Champagne fits this assumption well. Geographic distinctions within champagne region (a single appelation) are not emphasized.
" [E] ssence of champagne is that it is a blended wine, known in all but a handful of cases by the name of the maker, not the vineyard." (Johnson and Robinson, 2005) Quality determined by cellar-master's talent at blending, "dosing," etc. Sales policy emphasizes the brand.
In Burgundy, on the other hand, there are many small appelations, each of which is supposed to have distinct properties. Within the appelations, vineyards are further stratified into village wines, premier cru and grand cru. Many different producers typically make wine from grapes from the same grand cru vineyard. Conversely most producers have obtain grapes from multiple vineyards. Burgundians attribute most quality variation to place-specific terroir : the soil, topography, and microclimate. Comparing across wines from the same vineyard, they also emphasize vintage: year-specific weather. Since our data does not report the vineyard or the vintage of the wine exported, it would appear ill-suited to capture quality variation in burgundy wine. However, Robert Parker, the most influential wine critic in the world, asserts that there are large within-vineyard quality differences due to firm-specific variation in viticulture and vinification practices.
"Knowing the finest producers in Burgundy is unquestionably the most important factor in your success in finding the best wines."
There are several mechanisms supporting a cost-quality tradeoff in wine. First there is the cost of acquiring land with the desirable terroir properties. In Burgundy "village vineyards" cost e150-500K/ha (Robinson, 20??) . Assuming an interest rate of 5% and a typical yield of 5000 bottles per hectare, this corresponds to a unit land cost of e1.5-5 per bottle. On the other hand, land that has been designated as a grand cru vineyard costs over e2M/ha, or more than e20 per bottle. In the Champagne region the major, where the quality of land has been built into the price of grapes through the system called echelle des crus. Thus if we think of w(s) as the factor costs embodied in wine of quality s, we have good reasons to expect w > 0.
Wine is also believed to exhibit a trade-off between yield and quality. Low-yield viticulture, which involves pruning back vines from 40 hectalitres per hectare (the average in Burgundy) to 20 hl/ha (the yield at the Romanée Conti vineyard) doubles unit land costs. However, Parker and most other wine experts argue that this raises flavour concentration. Indeed the importance of yield is recognized in much of the AOC regulation in France which sets allowable yield levels by appelation.
The process of winemaking itself also exhibits cost-quality tradeoffs. One familiar example is the use of new oak barrel. The advantage of new oak is that imparts more flavour into the wine. However, our calclations indicate that it adds something in the neighborhood of e2 to the cost of each bottle.
Data

Trade data
We use the micro-data collected each year based on export declarations submitted to French Customs. It is an almost comprehensive database which reports annual shipments by destination at the 8-digit product level for each French exporting firm. The "almost" is due to EU legislation following the implementation of the single market, which set different thresholds for compulsory declarations inside and outside the customs union. Inside the EU, shipments are reported if their annual trade value exceeds 250,000 euro. Exports outside the EU are recorded unless their value is smaller than 1000 euros or one ton. For each firm, Customs records FOB values and quantities exported to 216 importing countries, and 11,578 8-digit product classifications (combined nomenclature, which is abbreviated as "nc8"). We have observations for the six years from 1998 to 2003. We calculate firm-destination-level FOB prices (often referred to as "unit values") as p j (i) = x j (i)/q j (i).
The nc8 is the harmonized system 6-digit (hs6) code with a 2-digit suffix that is particular to the European Union. Wine has hs4 of 2204. Sparkling wine is 220410 and still red wine less in less than two liter containers is 220421. For our purposes is fortunate that the last two digits of nc8 distinguish important wine-growing regions in the EU. Thus champagne, the sparkling wines of the official Champagne region are recorded as nc8 # 22041011. Furthermore, red wines from the Burgundy wine region is classified as nc8 # 22042143.
Champagne and red burgundy account for 0.45% and 0.048% respectively of French trade. These might not seem large shares, but they are impressive when compared to other goods. The mean good-level contribution to total trade is less than 0.01% and the largest exporting industry (aeroplanes and other aircraft exceeding 15 tons) accounts for only 3.24%. Our two goods are clearly among the largest 5% of contributors to French trade. They also are strong outliers in other dimensions. When ranking nc8 products according to number of exporting firms, champagne and red burgundy rank 21st and 65th respectively out of 11,578 products. Their importance is even more striking in terms of the number of destination countries. As figure 1 shows, those two industries export to a much larger number of countries than the typical French industry. The export declaration data provided us with firm identification numbers, or SIREN, for all 12,314 firms who exported any form of wine (hs4 = 2204) between 1998 and 2003. Of those, the French National institute (INSEE) provided us with the names, addresses, principal industry code, and other attributes of 10,341 firms in existence as of June 2007. We used the firm-level information to match our exporters with wine producers that were rated in two guidebooks.
Quality ratings
Wine producer quality ratings come from two different sources: i) a French one: Burtschy, Bernard and Antoine Gerbelle, 2006, Classement des meilleurs vins de France, Revue Des Vins De France (Paris), which we will refer to as RVF, ii) an internationally recognized one: Parker, Robert, Wine Buyer's Guide, 5th Edition, 1999, which we refer to as WBG. For each of the listed producers, the name and location were matched with the exporter's dataset by hand.
In RVF, listed producers receive between 0 and 3 stars. We have 64 champagne producers listed, and are able to match those with 51 exporters. For burgundy, 268 are listed, of which 206 can be found in the customs dataset. In WBG, producers (70 for champagne, and 159 for burgundy) are categorized as "average," "good," "excellent," or "outstanding." Of those we manage to find 47 champagne exporters and 139 burgundy exporters. Customs data lists exports by a firm for each nc8 product. However, in other firm-level sources of data, firms are classified according to a"primary" activity. It appears actually that a large proportion of wine exporters are not referenced as producers. Some of those "non-producing" exporters are dealers who mainly label and distribute wine made by other firms. Other firms are mainly dealers, but are also vertically integrated backwards into vinification and even viticulture.
We have to select a group of low quality producers. We cannot rely only on the group of exporters that are excluded from the ratings. It seems desirable to exclude from our analysis all firms that ship wine abroad but for which we are unable to judge quality of the wine exported. This happens for dealers that are not rated, who presumably export all sorts of wine. Those enter a category we refer to as "mixed" in figures 2 and 3. For producers, we consider as low quality firms, the ones that are unrated by either guide and located within the "right" areas, that is the relevant grape-growing départements. Unrated producers from other areas also enter the mixed category.
There are several issues that can be raised with guidebook ratings as quality measures:
1. The ratings are hard to interpret: units of measurement (stars) do not correspond to prices or quantities. Our theory includes parameter to measure marginal utility of quality units. This parametric approach also has the advantage of compactness in results presentation.
2. The ratings are unreliable: authors may have idiosyncratic tastes or be influenced by non-taste considerations. 8 In order to minimize this concern, we use two completely independent sets of ratings, for which we have no reason to suspect that authorspecific "specificities" would be correlated.
3. The ratings are incomplete: bad producers are usually omitted from the guidebooks and much wine is exported by non-producers. We try to correct for this by inferring the set of low quality firms and eliminating firms likely to have mixed quality.
4. The ratings may influence price directly: Some wine experts have become so famous worldwide, that their opinion exerts a direct impact on the price a firm can charge for its wine.
5. The ratings may influence demand by increasing foreign customer awareness. For instance, consumers in New Zealand are probably not aware of all varieties of red burgundy produced and available for consumption in France. A guide like Parker's, because it is in English, and so widely popular will change to effective set of varieties in the consumer's information set. To eliminate this concern, we run a separate set of regressions using only the French guide ratings (RVF) and restricting the sample to non-francophone markets (RVF is not translated).
Results
We start by presenting results on our firm-level predictions about how quality affects the probability to become an exporter, quantity shipped and price charged. Tables 7, 8 , 9, and 10 report results of our firm-level regressions. In each of those tables, the first three columns average the two quality ratings (WBG and RVF) when measuring s(i). The last three columns uses only the French rating (RVF) and restricts the sample to non-francophone countries. These regressions can be used to reveal the structural parameters of the model. Recall that equation (38) defines the elasticity of quantity with respect to quality as η qs ≡ (γ − λ)(σ − 1) − λ. Therefore, the implied value of γ is λ + (η qs + λ)/(σ − 1). Parameter λ can be obtained as the coefficient on log quality in the price regression, 0.29. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report 5 ≤ σ ≤ 10 as a reasonable range for the CES. Plugging in estimates obtained for the full sample, we infer γ to lie between 0.52 and 0.81. Using the higher of the two values, a consumer is willing to trade 3.7 bottles of low quality (s = 1) wine for one bottle of the highest quality (s = 5).
Individual level analysis
Furthermore, we can use estimates in Table 8 to test the Hallak (2006) assumption of income dependence of the preference for quality parameter, γ j = γ 0 + γ 1 ln(y j /y 0 ), where the income per capita of country j is normalized by the average world income (y 0 ). With this specification of preference for quality, the exported quantity equation becomes: c p < 0.1, b p < 0.05, a p < 0.01. y 0 = $6, 800 is the all-country average GDP per capita (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
With estimates of λ = 0.29 from the price equation and σ = 7 from the literature, one can provide estimates of both γ 0 and γ 1 .
The interaction term coefficient in column (3) implies γ 1 = 0.39/6 = 0.065. A doubling of GDP per capita generates a 6.5% increase in the quality preference parameter.
9 They also reveal γ 0 = (1.81/6)+0.29 = 0.6. Finally, preference for quality parameter is revealed to be around two thirds for a country with the average income per capita (y 0 = $6, 800), while for the United States in 2003 it is 0.6 + 0.065 × ln(37658/6800) = 0.71. Note also that the interaction coefficient should be zero for the price regression and almost is. 
Conditional mean analysis
We now proceed to the conditional mean analysis that allow a discrimination between the QD and the ED models, based on certain contrasting predictions, in particular on how average prices and average quantities vary according to the popularity (N j ) and attractiveness (A j ) of each market. The first set of relationships to examine are the relationships between conditional means and popularity shown in equations (21), (28), and (35). Since these are bivariate relationships, we can examine them directly using scatterplots of average quality, price, and quantity versus number of exporters. The quality sorting and efficiency sorting models both predict that all three relationships should be linear in log scale. Furthermore both models predict equal absolute slopes of opposite signs for the mean price and quantity figures. The quality sorting model alone predicts the negative average quality-popularity relationship, negative price-popularity relationship, and positive quantity-popularity relationship. c p < 0.1, b p < 0.05, a p < 0.01 y 0 = $6, 800 is the all-country average GDP per capita (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) .
The six scatterplots shown as panels (a)-(f) of Figure 4 mainly support the quality supporting predictions. Average quality and popularity exhibit a strong negative relationships in panels (a) and (b)-once popularity is sufficiently high. Although the relationship is not globally linear, this may be due to small-sample issues for the less popular markets. On the other hand, average quantity and popularity have a strong positive relationship in panel (e) for champagne and a noisier, but still clearly positive relationship for red burgundy in panel (f). The mean price panels (c) and (d) are disappointing. The slope for red burgundy is close to zero and that for champagne is only mildly negative. Some very popular markets like Japan (JPN) have high prices that run counter to the model. Tables 11 and 12 estimate the reduced form predictions based on equations (27) and (34). The quality sorting model predicts that any of the market primitives that raise attractiveness should lower average quality. They should have the same effect on price and the opposite sign effect on quantity. For champagne the results conform to priors remarkably well. Market size variables (population, income, high wine consumption) all raise popularity as predicted and lower average quality. Distance lowers popularity but raises quality. Speaking French (which is supposed to lower trade costs) raises popularity and lowers quality. Having high production of wine should reduce the price index in a market. This should reduce popularity and therefore raise quality. The signs are as expected although statistical significance is lacking. The performance for prices is disappointing as none of the size determinants enters significantly and all have small However, for the most part they also support the quality sorting model. One perverse result is the positive and significant effect of per capita income in the price equation (column 3). The reduced form version imposes some strong assumptions on A j , in particular regarding the specification of trade costs and the determinants of demand for wine in importing countries. Another path is possible using our results from the firm-level regressions. Equation (38) reveals that the fixed effects estimated in the regression explaining individual export quantity corresponds to ln A j in our model. One can retrieve those fixed effects, and estimate conditional mean regressions directly on ln A j , as theory suggests should be the case.
These bivariate relationships between means and imputed attractiveness are reported Tables 13 and 14 . The results once again offer much support for the quality sorting model. For both champagne and burgundy, popularity is more or less proportional to attractiveness. As predicted, average quality is negatively related to attractiveness. The sign on the price effect is supportive of quality sorting but it is only statistically significant for champagne. Finally the quantity relationships are strongly significant. Indeed the result is too strong to be consistent with the theory's prediction that the price and quantity effects be equal in absolute value. The asymmetry in magnitudes we find is also at odds with the efficiency sorting model. Taken together with the previous results, it seems to us that the prices are highly noisy and appear to be driven by forces outside the basic models. Noise in unit values is to be expected but perhaps greater predictive power would be possible in a model with some pricing to market. The Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman prediction of destination-invariant FOB prices seems hard to square with the results.
Conclusion
We have illustrated the importance of quality for trade by examining an industry in which quality can be measured (albeit imperfectly). Heterogeneous firms theory implies a threshold quality for market entry. The result is quality sorting: good firms are better able to serve difficult markets. We show firms with higher measured quality are more likely to export, export more, and charge higher prices. Champagne and (to a lesser extent) red burgundy exhibit quality sorting using direct measures. Quantities also respond to market attractiveness with the predicted sign. Firm-level prices exhibit much destination level variation that is not predicted by the model. Average prices do not exhibit quality sorting.
